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Killing the Fatted Calf: Managed Care
Liability in a Post-Pegram World
KARENE M. Boos, B.S.P.T., J.D.*

ERIC J. Boos, M.A., PH.D., J.D., LL.M.**

I. INTRODUCTION

he recent proliferation of managed health care has dramatically
affected the way most Americans receive their health care benefits.
Well over one hundred million Americans are enrolled in some kind
of managed care plan and the percentage of insured employees (in firms
with at least ten employees) with managed care plans is 66%.' At the heart
of every managed care insurance plan is an emphasis on cost containment. 2
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I.Saeid B. Aminib, Discrimination of International Medical Graduate Physicians by
Managed Care Organizations: Impact, Law, and Remedy, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L.
461, 473 n.63 (1999). Ronald Glasser puts the numbers much higher, claiming that "160.3
million of us now find ourselves held captive to corporate health-care systems." Ronald J.
Glasser, The Doctor Is Not In: On the Failure of Managed Health Care, HARPER'S
MAGAZINE, Mar. 1998, at 35.
2.
The majority of managed care insurers have elements of quality and cost
control systems that include practice reviews, guidelines, and advanced control over actual
utilization of benefits by both providers and patients. See RAND E. ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW
AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 20 (1997 & Supp. 1999-2000); See also Diana

Joseph Bearden & Bryan J. Maedgen, Emerging Theories of Liability in the Managed Care
Industry, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 285, 294 (1995); Bryce A. Jensen, From Tobacco to Health
Care and Beyond: A Critique of Lawsuits Targeting Unpopular Industries, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 1344, 1349-50 (2001); Eleanor D. Kinney, The Brave New World of Medical

Standards of Care, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 323, 325 (2001); Jeffrey Rugg, An Old Solution
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As a result, many patients have suffered poor health consequences because
of decisions by managed care insurers to deny requested benefits, and the
number of complaints against managed care organizations is rising.
The utilization review processes employed by managed care
companies cares very little about one's health-the "care" they have is for
effective cost containment in order to generate greater rofits. Such
"corporate health care systems... earn $952 billion a year, ' says Ronald
Glasser. "The system wasn't meant to care for sick people; it was meant to
make and manage money,",4 continues Glasser.
The problem has reached such an extreme that 2,300 physicians in
Massachusetts signed the following disparaging manifesto in the Journalof
the American Medical Association in December of 1997:
The time we are allowed to spend with the sick shrinks
under the pressure to increase throughput, as though we
were dealing with industrial commodities rather than
afflicted human beings . . . . Physicians and nurses are
being prodded by threats and bribes to abdicate allegiance
to patients, and to shun the sickest, who may be
unprofitable. Some of us risk being fired or "delisted" for
giving, or even discussing, expensive services, and many
are offered bonuses for minimizing care.5
The simple question is: How did managed care come to be what it is?
More importantly, what can be done to put the concern for health back into
health care?
The advent of managed care has generated a level of contempt and
skepticism toward the medical profession in general, and in the final
analysis it did not meet its intended goal of stemming the tide of rising
health care costs. It was predicted that by 2000, the average family (with
insurance coverage) would spend nearly $14,000 per year on health care.6
By the year 2000, it was estimated, health care costs would account for

to a New Problem: Physician Unions Take the Edge Off Managed Care, 34 COLUM. J.L. &

SOC. PROBS. I, 7 (2000).
3.
Glasser, supra note 1, at 35.
4.
Id. at 36.
5. Joan Agretelis et al., For Our Patients, Not for Profits, A Call to Action, 278
JAMA 1733, 1733 (1997).
6. INT'L TRADE ADMIN. U.S. DEP'T OF COM., U.S. INDUST. OUTLOOK 42 (1994).
This must also be measured against the fact that roughly 17% of Americans do not have
health insurance. See Cheralyn E.Schessler, Liability Implication of Utilization Review as a
Cost Containment Mechanism, 8 J.CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 379 (1992).

20031

KILLING THE FATTED CALF

18% of the United States' gross national product.7 The realization of those
predictions has triggered dramatic changes in health care delivery systems.
Still, despite organizational innovations, health care costs continue to rise.
Though the courts have generally protected cost containment
measures under the guise that managed care's proprietary economic
interests better serve the public (as evidenced by litigation related to the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 throughout the Act's
first twenty-five years), the Supreme Court's recent decision in Pegram v.
Herdrich8 has created a new line of attack against managed care
organizations. By holding that "mixed eligibility decisions" by medical
directors are not preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA), the Pegram Court has paved the way to challenge
benefit denials. Opponents of the Pegram decision fear a flood of new
litigation that will impede the progress (and predominance) of managed
care-thereby driving up costs to consumers and companies and killing the
level of efficiency in the administration of health care that has evolved
under the managed care system over the past thirty years.
This fear seems unfounded in light of the narrow context of the
Pegram decision, which only held that challenges to adverse benefits
decisions in which a medical director's decision involved an analysis of the
"how" and "when" of a proposed treatment were not preempted by ERISA
and should be pursued under state medical malpractice law. 9 However,
suing a medical director for malpractice is next to impossible without clear
evidence of the patient-physician relationship-which does not seem to
exist in the context of normal operation of a managed care organization. It
would seem, then, that without state reform of the medical malpractice
statutes to specifically include a new rendering of the patient-physician
relationship, the feared flood of new litigation will not happen.
The State of Wisconsin, however, has found a subtler and more
suitable approach to facilitating plaintiffs' challenges than reforming its
medical malpractice statutes. It simply requires that medical directors be
licensed physicians, and as such, they must carry medical malpractice
insurance.10 This statutory provision presupposes that medical directors are
making use of their medical knowledge when reviewing benefits decisions

7.
Leonard A. Hagen, Note, Physician Credentialing: Economic Criteria Compete
With the Hippocratic Oath, 31 GONz. L. REV. 427, 428-29 (1995-96).

8.
530 U.S. 211 (2000).
9.
Id. at 236-37.
10.
Wisconsin Statute section 609.34 requires all managed care organizations to
appoint a licensed physician as medical director, and licensed physicians are required to
carry medical malpractice insurance. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 609.34 (West Supp. 2002).
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and therefore are acting as physicians who should be subject to medical
malpractice standards." All that is missing in Wisconsin is a test case in
which a cavalier court sees the traditional patient-physician relationship in
a little broader context.12 Until such a test case succeeds, Wisconsin is not
likely to fare much better than other states with respect to the level of
satisfaction of managed care plan participants. MCO's profits are up in
Wisconsin and on the national level, but so too are the number of
complaints.' 3 The day is coming when the fatted calf shall be killed.
II. THE ADVERSE EFFECT OF COST-CONTAINMENT MEASURES
Judy Amburgey was employed by Spartech Corporation, which
maintained a health benefit plan for is employees.' 4 That plan was funded
by a health insurance policy issued to Spartech by First Allmerica Life
Insurance Company, and it was administered by Seabury & Smith. Ms.
Amburgey contracted leukemia and was treated at the University of Texas
MD Anderson Center in Houston. On August 10, 1999, Ms. Amburgey's
oncologist, Dr. Thomas Martin, wrote a letter marked "Urgent Review
Requested," which Seabury & Smith answered on August 25, 1999. 5 Dr.
Martin's letter described his diagnosis of Ms. Amburgey's chronic
myelogenous leukemia and stated that her case was unlikely to be cured by
chemotherapy or radiation. He wrote: "the only documented therapy
capable of curing this disease is bone marrow transplantation from a
histocompatible donor."'16 Because of Ms. Amburgey's "unstable medical
condition," Dr. Martin asked for authorization of insurance coverage in
order to proceed quickly with the transplantation process, beginning with
the search for a compatible donor.

1I. Interview with Julie Walsh, Attorney at the Office of the Commissioner of
Insurance, in Madison, Wis. (Feb. 10 & 16, 2003) The legal committee of the Patient's
Compensation Fund, as well as the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance (OCI), holds
the view that any time a physician looks at medical records or reviews a patient's charts,
he/she is using clinical knowledge and it should be treated as though there is a patientphysician relationship. Id.
12.

Id.

13.
Id. See also Press Release, State of Wisconsin Office of the Commissioner of
Insurance, HMO Grievances Rise With Consumer Awareness in 1999 (April 3, 2000) (on
file with author).
14.
Isaac v. Seabury & Smith, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12413, at *2 (S.D. Ind.
July 5, 2002).

15.

16.

Id. at *3.
Id.
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On August 25, 1999, Seabury & Smith wrote back to Dr. Martin,
denying coverage of the treatment. The determination letter stated that
transplantation "cannot be considered a covered expense pursuant to the
terms and conditions of the employee welfare benefit plan."' 7 Based on the
utilization review process, which included a review of the supporting
documentation by a board certified oncologist, the procedure was deemed
not covered because it was not "medically necessary."' 8 This initial denial
was modified on September 23, 1999, when Dr. Sheila Donnelly, writing
for Seabury & Smith, gave "conditional approval" for the transplant. Ms.
Amburgey died on October 7, 1999.19
Cynthia Herdrich belonged to a Health Maintenance Organization
(HMO) through her husband's employer. 20 The HMO was comprised of
Carle Clinic Association, P.C., Health Alliance Medical Plans, Inc., and
Carle Health Insurance Management Co., Inc. (collectively Carle). Carle
was a for-profit HMO owned by the physicians in the group who provided
pre-paid medical services to participants whose employers contracted with
Carle. 21
Cynthia Herdrich was experiencing severe abdominal pain and was
seen by Carle physician Lori Pegram. Dr. Pegram discovered a six-by-eight
centimeter inflamed mass in Herdrich's abdomen. Despite the noticeable
inflammation, Dr. Pegram did not order an ultrasound diagnostic procedure
at a local hospital, but instead decided that Herdrich would have to wait
eight more days for an ultrasound to be performed at a facility staffed by
Carle that was located more than fifty miles away.22 Before the eight days
were over, Herdrich's appendix burst, causing peritonitis.
Carmine Cicio was insured through Vytra Healthcare, Inc., an HMO.2 3
He suffered from a type of blood cancer known as multiple myeloma. Mr.
Cicio's oncologist wrote a letter to Vytra in 1998 seeking approval to treat
the disease with high-dose chemotherapy and a double infusion of Mr.
Cicio's own stem cells.24 The chemotherapy destroys not only cancer cells,
but also normal blood-producing cells in the bone marrow. The stem cell
transplants replace normal cells killed in chemotherapy.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
part Cicio
24.

Id. at *4.

Isaac, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12413, at *4.
Id.
Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 215 (2000).
Id. at 215.
Id.
Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 2003), aff'g in part and remanding in
v. Vytra Healthcare, 208 F. Supp. 2d 288 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
Cicio. 321 F.3d at 87.
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Mr. Cicio's doctor said the procedure was a "well-established method
of treatment" for multiple myeloma, and that it offered a better chance of
survival than any other therapy.2 5 But Vytra's medical director, Dr. Brent
W. Spears, denied the request. The procedure, he said, was experimental,
and therefore was "not a covered benefit" under the terms of the insurance
plan.2 6
After an appeal by Mr. Cicio's doctor, the company approved a
different treatment, chemotherapy with a single infusion of stem cells,
which doctors say is often less effective. Mr. Cicio died in May 1998.
A.

THE ESSENCE OF MANAGED CARE: COST CONTAINMENT

In all three of these cases, the course of treatment recommended by
the primary (treating) physicians was delayed, causing patients great
emotional distress and in two of the cases, contributing to the death of the
patients. The motive in delaying treatment was "cost-containment," which
is the essence of managed care.
Managed care is a framework of financing and organizing health care.
The goal of managed care is to decrease costs by exercising more direct
control over the provision of health care. In a managed care system a
patient seeking health care usually is limited to a select number of
participating physicians. 27 Some MCOs do give patients the option to use a
physician of their own choice, but this option usually results in a penalty of
higher costs to the insured.
Additionally, in most MCOs, the participating physician agrees to
follow certain treatment guidelines adopted by the MCO. 28 These
guidelines are established in order to try to contain treatment costs. The
guidelines usually set forth the appropriate medical treatment based on the
patient's diagnosis. Physicians are usually contractually bound to follow
these guidelines and thus must seek approval from the MCO if a different
course of treatment is believed to be necessary. Thus, giving the patient
limited options in physician selection and requiring physicians to follow
cost-containing guidelines affect individual health care in a managed care
system. Since managed care is on the rise, this effect is a concern for many
Americans. Perhaps the best statement of the problem comes from the

25.
id. at 88.
26.
Id.
27.
Vickie Yates Brown, Managed Care at the Crossroads: Can Managed Care
OrganizationsSurvive Government Regulation?, 7 ANNALS HEALTH L. 25, 27-28 (1998).
28.
Susan 0. Scheutzow, A Frameworkfor Analysis of ERISA Preemption in Suits

Against Health Plans and a Callfor Reform, I I J.L. & HEALTH 195, 200 (1996-97).
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Supreme Court of the United States: "HMOs became popular because feefor-service physicians were thought to be providing unnecessary or useless
services; but today, many doctors and observers argue that HMOs often
ignore the individual needs of a patient in order to improve the HMOs
bottom lines. 29
The courts, regardless of how individual patients may have suffered
indignity and injustice, have ironically upheld those bottom lines as
legitimate. As the Supreme Court stated:
the defining feature of an HMO is receipt of a fixed fee for
each patient enrolled under the terms of a contract to
provide specified health care if needed. The HMO thus
assumes a financial risk of providing these benefits . . .
[L]ike other risk-bearing organizations, HMOs take steps
to control costs . . . [H]ence in an HMO system, a
physician's
financial interest lies in providing less care, not
30
more.

The only check on this system that puts financial incentives above
patient needs is "the professional obligation to provide covered services
with a reasonable degree of skill and judgment in the patient's interest.",3'
However, the HMO system is structured so as to eliminate the need for
treating physicians to have to use discretion in determining appropriate
treatment. That function is reserved for the medical director, and that
creates a catch-22 for patients who are denied treatment. A patient's
physician can prescribe all the treatments in the world and do his/her best
to initiate a complete healing process, but the determination is in the hands
of a corporate executive who is basing the determination on financial
32
criteria and contractual language-seeking to contain costs on all counts.
Given the structure of HMOs, patients who have sought to challenge such
decisions have found themselves without legal recourse. This has been due

29.
Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 220 (2000).
30.
Id.at 211.
31.
Id. at 218.
32.
As we shall see, this is the paradoxical problem of managed care that the Fifth
Circuit Court recognized in the juxtaposition of the Pegram case and its own position in
Corcoran v. United Healthcare, 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1033
(1992). See infra note 62. The Court's contextualization of the problem points to the
impervious nature of managed care organizations and shall be discussed in detail later in the
paper. See infra Section III.A.
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to the power of preemption under federal law, which can be seen in the
history of the emergence of managed care.
B.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF MANAGED CARE

Before the 1930s, patients paid directly for medical services under the
traditional American health care system. But after the Great Depression
drastically lowered middle class incomes, America's traditional health care
payment system was undermined.3 3 Since patients were no longer able to
pay physicians directly, health care costs needed to be spread over a large
number of people. Thus, the rise of private health insurance was inevitable.
Indemnity benefit plans were the predominant form of early private
health insurance. Although the middle and upper classes enjoyed a host of
benefits under these plans, the non-working class was largely left
uninsured.3 4 In the 1960s, the absence of health benefits for the growing
number of elderly people created a powerful political group which, in part,
resulted in the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965.35 This federal
legislation, coupled with advances in expensive health care technology, led
to an enormous rise in national health care spending.36 This set the stage for
37
the emergence of managed care. In 1973, Congress passed the HMO Act
authorizing the business-like structure of managed care organizations and
then proceeded to insulate them from legal attack with the passage of
ERISA in 1974.38

33.
David D. Griner, Note, Paying the Piper: Third Party Payor Liability for
Medical Treatment Decisions, 25 GA. L. REV. 861, 874 (199 1).

34.
The middle and upper classes were able to purchase indemnity health insurance
such as Blue Cross Blue Shield and many employers began offering health insurance plans
as an alternative to wage increases. This resulted in a rise of private health insurance from
50.3% of the total population insured privately in 1950 to 81. I% of the total population

insured privately in 1980. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., U.S. Health Care Coverage and Costs:
Historical Development and Choices for the 1990s, 21 J.L. & MED. ETHICS 141, 144 tbl. 2

(1993).
35.
Medicare, Title 18 of the Social Security Act, provides federal hospitalization
and medical coverage for persons over sixty-five. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ggg.
Medicaid, Title 19 of the Social Security Act, provides federal matching funds for state
medical assistance programs for the poor. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v.
36.
In 1960 the health care share of the Gross National Product was 5.3% while in
1990 it rose to 12.2%. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 34, at 142 tbl. I. See also Sally T. Burner

et al., National Health Expenditures Projections through 2030, 14 HEALTH CARE FIN. R. 1,

36 tbl. 3 (1992).
37.
42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 300e-17 (2000).
38.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (1974). Under ERISA, qualified medical plans were immune from State
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Il. THE PROBLEM OF PREEMPTION
A.

THE HISTORY OF PREEMPTION

Any federal statute raises the issue of preemption. The general
principle of federal preemption is that, subject only to the substantive
limitations on its power, Congress may preempt state law to whatever
extent Congress so chooses.

Congress may structure a federal law to

govern a cause of action ("conflict preemption"), or it may structure a
federal law to "occupy the field" in which causes may arise ("complete
preemption"). 40 However, Congress rarely articulates an express intent to
completely preempt state law in a certain area because it does not want to
tread upon the historic police powers of the States without a clear and
manifest purpose. 4' Thus, as Judge Easterbrook explained in Lehmann v.
Brown:
"[C]omplete preemption" is a misnomer, having nothing to
do with preemption and everything to do with federal
occupation of a field. The name misleads because, when
federal law occupies the field (as in labor law), every claim
arises under federal law. Any attempt to present a state-law
theory then is artful pleading to get around the federal
ingredient of the claim; courts look at the substance, see

malpractice laws and thereby gained an important economic advantage over non-qualified
plans. See Edward Richards and Thomas McLean, Physicians in Managed Care: A
Multidimensional Analysis of New Trends in Liability and Business Risk, 18 J.LEGAL MED.
443 (1996).
39.
See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 767
(1994).
40.
Isaac v. Seabury & Smith, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12413, at *7 (S.D. Ind.
July 5, 2002). "Federal pre-emption is ordinarily a federal defense to the plaintiffs suit. As a
defense, it does not appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint." Id. "Congress may so
completely pre-empt a particular area that any civil complaint ... is necessarily federal in
character." Id. at *7-*8. Two areas of federal law in which preemption is "complete" are:
labor relations (under the National Labor Relations Act and the Labor Management
Relations Act) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. See id. at *10.
Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985).
41.
See also Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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the importance of federal law to recovery, and permit
removal 42
.
Following this, courts are discerning Congress' intent whenever they
engage in preemption inquiry.43 In such cases, courts are left to infer
preemptive intent either from the fact that a federal statute occupies the
field or from the fact that state law directly conflicts with, or "stands as an
obstacle to" the objectives of Congress." Courts generally disfavor
employing implied preemption analyses, and the Supreme Court has even
demanded that Congress make a "clear statement" when it enacts
legislation that alters the balance of power between the state and federal
governments.4 5

On that account, ERISA's "express" preemption provision, that it
"supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan,"4 6 initially came as somewhat of a
relief to judges.47 The express limits on the scope of this preemption
notwithstanding, the preemptive powers under ERISA proved highly
ambiguous.48 As Judge Easterbrook stated:
ERISA occupies much of the field of pension and fringe
benefits; the size and distribution of these benefits depends
on federal law, so Metropolitan Life holds that a claim to
benefits necessarily "arises under" federal law no matter

42.
230 F.3d 916, 919 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
43.
See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987).
44.
E.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm., 461
U.S. 190, 204 (1983) (stating the conventional "implied" preemption rule).
45.
See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991) (providing the "clear
statement" rule). Worth noting, however, is that this "clear statement" rule would invalidate
the entire line of ERISA preemption decisions, a consequence the U.S. Supreme Court
apparently did not consider. Id.
46.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
47.
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 522-23 (1981). The
Supreme Court said in its first ERISA preemption opinion, "we are assisted by an explicit
congressional statement about the pre-emptive effect of'the statute [ERISA]." Id.
48.
First, only state laws affecting "employee benefit plans" covered by ERISA are
preempted and this excludes state workers' compensation or disability benefit laws.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, § 4(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3) (2000).
Secondly, the savings clause exempts state insurance laws, which has given rise to a whole
new area of litigation with the emergence of managed care organizations that are regulated
under state insurance laws, but involve welfare benefits regulated under ERISA plans.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)
(2000).
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how it is pleaded. State law is "completely preempted" in
the sense that it has been replaced by federal law-but this
happens because federal law takes over all similar claims,
not because there is a preemption defense.49
Though the preemption clause afforded the courts a modicum of the
"express" character they longed for, they nevertheless had to engage in an
inferential process much like the "implied preemption analyses" they so
despised using in other instances. The courts' efforts to decide cases by
reference to the "ordinary meaning of 'relate to,"'' 50 evidenced the difficulty
posed by the statute's ambiguity. The Supreme Court went so far as to
explain that the plain meaning of the phrase "relates to" can be taken
directly from the dictionary and that such a definition was determinative of
the issue. 5 1 This position has led to some very undesirable consequences.
Even though ERISA was heralded as very significant federal protective
labor legislation, its' preemption provision invalidated many progressive
state laws.52
Taken to its logical extreme, the text-based analysis of the Supreme
Court would create a regulatory vacuum that would preempt almost every

49.
50.
51.

Lehmann v. Brown, 230 F.3d 916, 919-920 (7th Cir. 2000).
District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 129 (1992).
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 n.16 (1983) (citing BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1158 (5th ed. 1979) for the proposition that "[r]elate" means "[t]o stand in
some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or
connection with").
52.
Criticism of ERISA preemption comprises a huge portion of the legal literature
on health care and related topics. Some of the more important criticisms made before the
U.S. Supreme Court moved away from its strict "textual" approach to ERISA preemption
include: Jay Conison, ERISA and the Language of Preemption, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 619
(1994); Paul O'Neil, Protecting ERISA Health Care Claimants: Practical Assessment of a
Neglected Issue in Health Care Reform, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 723 (1994); Leon E. Irish &
Harrison J. Cohen, ERISA Preemption: Judicial Flexibility and Statutory Rigidity, 19 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 109 (1985); William J.Kilberg & Paul D. Inman, Preemption of State
Laws Relating to Employee Benefit Plans: An Analysis of ERISA Section 514, 62 TEX. L.
REV. 1313 (1984). Some of the more recent literature (since the Supreme Court's shift in
Blue Cross in 1995) includes: Louis Saccoccio, Pegram's Significance for Managed Health
Care, I YALE J.HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 195 (2001); Michael T. Cahill & Peter D.
Jacobson, Pegram's Regress: A Missed Chance for Sensible Judicial Review of Managed
Care Decisions, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 421 (2001); Jeffrey R. Wahl, Pegram v. Herdrich:
HMOs Aren't Perfect, But.... 27 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 297 (2000); Jack E. Karns, Employer
Sponsored Health Benefit Plans Under ERISA After Pegram v. Herdrich: The Fiduciary
Duty Argument and Mixed Eligibility Versus Treatment Decisions, 15 J.L. & HEALTH I
(2000-2001); Dawn M. Kelly, The Effect of Pegram v. Herdrich on HMO Liability, 17
ToURo L. REV. 841 (2001).
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state law that bore some relation to employee benefits, including state
common law and statutory claims for: family leave,53 workers'
compensation programs, 54 prevailing wage laws, 55 working conditions of
apprentices, 6 mechanic's liens, statutes allocating damages in torts 58 or
wrongful death,59 taxes on hospitals,6 ° state efforts to make health
insurance available,6 ' and even medical malpractice claims.62 On this
account, ERISA is evidence that the Court's effort to "merge federalism
instincts with the plain meaning doctrine of statutory interpretation" is not
likely to bring clarity to the area of preemption, 63 concluded Judge
Easterbrook.

53.
Gabrielle Lessard, Conflicting Demands Meet Conflict of Laws: ERISA
Preemption of Wisconsin's Family and Medical Leave Act, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 809.
54.
See District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992).
55.
See Associated Builders & Contractors v. Baca, 769 F.Supp. 1537 (N.D. Cal.
1991).
56.
Hamilton v. Air Jamaica, 945 F.2d 74, 78 (3d Cir. 1991).
57.
Trs. of the Elec. Workers Health & Welfare Trust v. Marjo Corp., 988 F.2d
865, 868 (9th Cir. 1992).
58.
Travitz v. NE Dep't ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund, 13 F.3d 704, 709-10 (3d
Cir. 1994).
59.
Mclnnis v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 21 F.3d 586, 589 (4th Cir.
1994).
60.
NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund v. Axelrod, 27 F.3d 823 (2d Cir.
1994).
61.
See Gen. Split Corp. v. Mitchell, 523 F. Supp. 427 (E.D. Wis. 1981); See also
Bricklayers Local No. I Welfare Fund v. La. Health Ins. Ass'n, 771 F. Supp. 771 (E.D. La.
1991); N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645 (1995).
62.
See Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992). The standard put forth under Corcoran is particularly
problematic because if ERISA preempts claims against HMOs and their employees, then
plaintiffs have no one to sue for malpractice. According to the Fifth Circuit, "after Pegram,
if a doctor recommends treatment, and the HMO denies the coverage, the patient has no
remedy." Id. at 1338. "In this circuit, HMO's can escape all liability if they instruct their
doctors to recommend every possible treatment and leave the real decision to HMO
administrators. It is difficult to believe that one of Congress's goals in passing ERISA was
to shift medical judgments from doctors to plan administrators." Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307
F.3d 298, 315 (5th Cir. 2002). The court in Roark contextualizes the present preemption
dilemma perfectly by stating that the Pegram court held, "because ERISA § 502(a)
preempts any overlapping state law, this would create 'a puzzling issue of preemption' [as]
it 'would seem to be a prescription for preemption of state malpractice law.' This could not
be so . . . [because] 'there is no ERISA preemption without clear manifestation of
congressional purpose.' " id. at 308 (citations omitted).
63.
Frank L. Easterbrook, Constitutional Law Conference, 61 U.S.L.W. 2237, 2248
(Oct. 27. 1992).
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The line of cases from 1974 to 1995 followed the tortured
commitment to the "plain meaning doctrine" with regard to ERISA
preemption (and the "relates to" phrase). Though there were thousands of
ERISA preemption cases in that period, the U.S. Supreme Court heard very
few. They offered opinions in only twelve, and decided a number of others
without comment. 64 Over the course of those cases, the tension between the
ambiguous statute and the "plain meaning" standard employed by the
courts in determining preemption became evermore apparent.
In the first such case, Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., the
Supreme Court began by invoking "respect for the separate spheres of
governmental authority preserved in our federalist system., 65 This first
decision created an attitude that ERISA preemption was of a broad and
sweeping variety. In spite of this, and almost prophetically, the Court noted
that the phrase "relates to" "gives rise to some confusion where, as here, it
is asserted to apply to a state law ostensibly regulating a matter quite
different from pension plans. 66 The Court determined, however, that the
subject and purpose of a state law are irrelevant to the ERISA preemption
inquiry and thus, the Court decided that ERISA preemption was broader
than ordinary federal preemption (which displaces only laws inconsistent
with provisions or goals of federal law or in areas traditionally regulated by
the federal government). In essence, the Court attempted to ensure that the
structure of benefit plans would be left to the discretion of pension plan
designers.
In Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., the Court held that two state laws
prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy and requiring
employers to provide sick leave to employees disabled by pregnancy fell
within ERISA's "relate to" language. 67 As a matter of course, the Court
held that the meaning of the phrase "relates to" is unambiguous and that it
necessarily requires broad preemption. "A law 'relates to' an employee
benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or

64.
See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Agslaud, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980) affd 454
U.S. 801 (1981); Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. Ilsley, 690 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1982), aff'd
sub nor. Arcudi v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 463 U.S. 1220 (1983); Local Union 598,
Plumbers & Pipefitters Indus. Journeymen & Apprentices Training Fund v. J.A. Jones
Constr. Co., 846 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 488 U.S. 881 (1988).
65.
451 U.S. 504, 522 (1981).
66.
Id. at 523-24.
67.
463 U.S. 85, 100 (1983). The Court held that ERISA preempted such laws only
to the extent that their protections were more generous than Title VII. Id. at 108-09. In other
words, the Court held that employee benefit plans must comply with Title VII's antidiscrimination provisions, but not with state anti-discrimination laws. See id.at 103-04.
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reference to such a plan. 6 8 In support of this conclusion, the Court cited
Black's Law Dictionary for the definition of "relate," and emphasized that
it was necessary to read the phrase in its broadest sense.6 9
The reliance on dictionary language did not reduce the uncertainty
about the scope of preemption in general, and in fact created the worse
problem of an overly-broad notion of preemption. The court recognized
this problem, as evidenced by an exception created in a footnote by stating
that some state laws "may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous,
remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to'
the plan. 7 °
MetropolitanLife Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts7 1is the first case in
which the Court hinted that the "plain meaning/text-based" analysis is not
sufficient. There, the Court mixed a plain meaning analysis with purposive
analysis in an effort to reconcile ERISA's protective purposes with what
the Court thought to be sweeping preemption of state law. A unanimous
Court, per Justice Blackmun, held that a Massachusetts law that required
certain health care benefits to be included in any health insurance policy or
employee health benefit plan was not preempted as applied to insurance
policies because it was saved by the state insurance law exception. 72 The
Court created a framework that enabled employee benefit plan sponsors to
evade state regulation by self-insuring rather than purchasing insuranceand the Court took no responsibility for the irrational results. The opinion
stated, "we merely give life to a distinction created by Congress," and
pointed out that a congressional committee had become aware of this

68.
id. at 96-97.
69.
Id. at 97-98 & n. 16.
70.
Id. at 100 n.21. Although this case was the beginning of the Court's fruitless
pursuit of the "plain meaning" approach to ERISA preemption, a worse consequence
resulted. In this case, the Court passed up the opportunity to distinguish preemption in the
pension area from the non-pension area without considering the possibility that the
preemption clause could be interpreted differently with respect to these two very different
fields. This might be due to the fact that welfare benefits were an ancillary topic in the
development of ERISA. The primary concern was to protect employees from unscrupulous
manipulation of benefits packages by employers. Welfare benefits were somewhat of an
afterthought-hence the reason that managed care organizations and complex health
benefits pose such a difficulty today. The plain meaning approach reached its most ludicrous
formulation in District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade, when Justice
Thomas held that ERISA preempts any state law that "refers to welfare benefit plans" or
that imposes "requirements by reference to such covered programs." 506 U.S. 125, 130-31
(1992).
71.
471 U.S. 724 (1985).
72.
Id. at 724-25.
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possibility shortly after ERISA was enacted, but corrective legislation had
died in the Senate.73
In spite of the irrational outcome of Metropolitan Life, the Court did
not back away from its prior rendering of ERISA's preemptive power as
broad and sweeping. It did, however, move slightly away from the rationale
for broad preemption that it gave in Alessi. Not until several years later,
when the Court again confronted the absurdity of the distinction between
insured and uninsured plans in FMC Corp. v. Holliday,74 did any justice
publicly acknowledge that the Court's interpretive choice had perhaps been
a mistake.7 5 Unfortunately, the Court was fairly well committed to that
defective line of reasoning.
Pilot Life Insurance. Co. v. Dedeaux provided perhaps the most cited
standard for ERISA preemption: that Congress intended section
502(a)(1)(B) to be the sole remedy available.76 It has been referred to as
"the categorical preemption" standard and has been taken in conjunction
with UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America v. Ward,77 to form the core of claim
procedures under ERISA. Pilot Life held that state law claims of bad faith
brought against an insurer of a welfare benefits plan are preempted under
ERISA without any determination that the insurer was a fiduciary.7 8 This
case placed the standard of preemption determination squarely on the
relationship of federal law to damages and recovery. This proved to be a
precursor to the "economic impact" standard that would emerge later.
Fort Halifax Packing Co. Inc. v. Coyne held that a severance payment
required by Maine law was not preempted by ERISA. 79 This marked a
turning point for the Court insofar as it allowed for "payroll practices" and
"conditions of employment" not to be preempted. In carving out this
exception, the Court analyzed the purpose of the Maine statute and held
that "pre-emption of the Maine statute would not further the purpose of
ERISA pre-emption.,, 80 As the Court saw it, the point of ERISA
preemption was to permit employers with employee benefit plans to

73.
Id. at 747. Perhaps the unintended, and irrational, result was what prompted the
Court to look to the purpose of the statute for additional support. Id. at 747 n.25.
74.
498 U.S. 52 (1990).
75.
Id. at 65-67 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
76.
481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987).
77.
526 U.S. 358 (1999).
78.
Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50-51, 57. This view was softened considerably by the
Court in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002).
79.
482 U.S. 1,23 (1987).
80.
Id. at 8.
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comply with a single set of administrative requirements regarding the
payment of benefits. 8'
In Massachusetts v. Morash,82 the Court set a very cavalier precedent,
but unfortunately, it was not revisited for six years, until the Court decided
New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Insurance Co. 83 in 1995. In Morash, the Court tried to link the scope of
preemption to the protections of ERISA by characterizing the purpose of
the statute in question as for the protection of workers and therefore only
tangentially related to employee benefits.84 However, the basic
indeterminacy of statutory purpose made reliance on it very problematic for
the Court and the strategy was abandoned until 1995.
The Court repeatedly has asserted that broad preemption serves a
claimed fundamental purpose of ERISA, namely, to encourage growth of
the private employee benefit system by sparing plans and employer plan
sponsors form the supposed inefficiencies that might result if plans were
subject to state regulation. 85 The Court is evidently convinced that if plan
sponsors find it unduly difficult to maintain plans, or if the law requires
that plans be unduly generous to employees, plan sponsors will decide not
to create plans or will reduce benefits.
We see this same concern surging to the fore with the evolution of
managed care organizations that facilitate welfare benefit plans for
employers and their employees. In that context, the Court has gone to great
lengths to protect the viability of managed care organizations. Nonetheless,
it is precisely this issue that begs the question with regard to the appropriate
standard for determining ERISA preemption. As we shall see with regard
to the Fifth Circuit's view, an absurd result occurs if claims against HMOs
and MCOs are preempted. But that is jumping ahead. We first must
consider the Court's radical shift away from the broad interpretation of
ERISA's preemptive powers.
B.

RETHINKING PREEMPTION IN LIGHT OF A "QUALITY OF CARE"

STANDARD

The Supreme Court finally recognized the absurdity of applying a
"plain meaning/text-based" analysis to ERISA preemption and it was

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 11.
490 U.S. 107 (1989).
514 U.S. 645 (1995).
Morash, 490 U.S. at 119.

See, e.g., Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 10 (1987).
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forced to amend its approach-admitting that the language of section
514(a) was "unhelpful. 86 The Court abandoned its commitment to the
"plain meaning/text-based" analysis of preemption in Travelers, and
conceded that the phrase "relates to" requires a modifier in order to have a
concrete meaning. 87 Therefore, the Court put itself back in the position of
having to engage in an inferential analysis of congressional intent with
regard to the preemptive power of ERISA. This is by no means an easy
task. Though the legislative history of ERISA is voluminous, it reveals that
Congress gave little thought to the issue of preemption.8 8 The broad
language of section 514 "was not a deeply considered result of the years of
planning, negotiating, and drafting the bill that was passed by Congress." 89
The new approach to ERISA preemption was first articulated in
Travelers.90 The Supreme Court held that from that point on, courts should
decide whether ERISA preempts state law not by asking whether the
language requires it, but whether preemption makes sense as a matter of
ERISA policy. 9' To accomplish this, courts must do what Congress failed
to do-develop a preemption doctrine sensitive to the different degrees of
substantive regulation that ERISA imposes on pensions as opposed to nonpension benefits. The Court said, "we simply must go beyond the unhelpful
text and the frustrating difficulty of defining its key term, and look instead
to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide
to the scope of the state
92
law that Congress understood would survive.,
After making this claim, and essentially mandating a new pragmatic
standard for ERISA preemption, the Court set about reconciling it with the

86.
N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers, 514 U.S. 645,
646 (1995).
87.
Id. at 655.
88.
The legislative history of ERISA up to 1974 has been compiled and published

in a three-volume set. Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare, 94th Congress, 2d Session, Legis. History of ERISA (Comm. Print 1976).

89.

Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C. Schaffer, Semi-Preemption in ERISA: Legis.

Processand Health Policy, 7 AM. J.TAX POL'Y 47, 48 (1988).

90.
The decision in Travelers is paralleled by Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, hIc., 57
F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1009 (1996). Dukes held that negligence
claims against MCOs are not completely preempted by ERISA. Id. at 356. It held that state
law claims would still be subject to the well-pleaded complaint rule, in the absence of
complete preemption, and would not be removed to Federal Court. Id. at 355. The court also
held that quality of benefits claims (such as malpractice) do not ask the court to clarify
rights to any future benefits or to enforce rights under the terms of the plan, and are
therefore not preempted. Id. at 358. Dukes is part of a growing trend of cases that hold that
medical malpractice claims against HMOs are not preempted.
91.
Travelers, 515 U.S. at 655-57.
92.
Id. at 656.
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prior case history. The Court asserted that the objective behind section
514(a) was to "minimize the administrative and financial burden of
complying with conflicting directives. '93 Thus, the Court recast the
preemption consideration in light of the "indirect economic effects" that a
state law might have on the plan. The threshold question thus becomes
whether the effect "binds plan administrators to any particular choice"
about which benefits to provide and if it
"preclude[s] uniform
administrative practice or the provision of a uniform interstate benefit
package if a plan wishes to provide one." 94
This new standard also assesses the activities of the plan doctors and
administrators from a "quality of care" perspective as opposed to a strict
eligibility perspective. 95 As the Third Circuit has said, the distinction
between "quality of care" and the "administration of benefits" is roughly
analogous to the Supreme Court's distinction between "treatment"
decisions on the one hand and "coverage" or "eligibility" decisions on the
other. 96 Eligibility and treatment decisions are often inextricably linked
according to the Supreme Court in Pegram and such "mixed eligibility"
decisions are not preempted by ERISA. Thus, the "economic
impact/quality of care" standard provides a method for determining
whether a decision was of "mixed" variety because it necessarily asks
whether a physician/administrator dealt with the "how" and "when" of the
treatment.
Having courts exercise this pragmatic standard makes all the more
sense in light of the fact that in enacting ERISA, Congress did not adopt
different preemption standards for state laws relating to pensions and
fiduciary behavior (which ERISA explicitly and extensively regulates) as
opposed to welfare benefits (which ERISA does not comprehensively
regulate), and treating these similarly creates opportunities
for injustice in
97
the modem era of managed care organizations.

93.
Id. (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990)).
94.
Id. at 659.
95.
This is part of a growing trend initiated by Dukes. See supra note 90. It is
reiterated in Nealy v. US Healthcare HMO, in which the court specifically held that the
plaintiffs malpractice action based on the plan physician's failure to successfully comply
with the defendant HMO's referral process was not preempted by ERISA. 711 N.E.2d 621,
625 (N.Y. 1999).
96.
See Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266, 278-79 (3d Cir. 2000)
(reasoning that quality of care decisions are like medical malpractice claims-fields
"traditionally occupied by state regulation."). See also Dukes, 57 F.3d at 357.
97.
Many state legislatures have taken progressive attitudes toward regulating
managed care organizations under state insurance law, and these novel attempts have been
upheld recently by the Supreme Court of the United States. See, e.g., Rush Prudential HMO,
Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002) (upholding an Illinois State Law requiring managed care
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In defense of Congress, there is no way it could have foreseen the
dynamic changes that would result in welfare benefits after they passed the
HMO Act of 1972. Managed care organizations have forced an evolution in
the administration of health care benefits that are well beyond anything
Congress could have anticipated. In response to such an overwhelming
social change, the Supreme Court abandoned the more expansive view of
ERISA preemption that dominated the case law for the first twenty years of
ERISA in favor of a more pragmatic and practical standard that fits the
dynamic nature of welfare benefits. This is reflected in the string of cases
since 1995.
The most important of these cases after Travelers, and the one which
gives the clearest articulation of the new standard for determining
preemption for causes against doctors and managed care organizations, is
Pegram v. Herdrich.98 The Court in Pegram concluded that, "in the field
of health care, a subject of traditional state regulation, there is no ERISA
preemption without clear manifestation of congressional purpose." 99 Thus,
courts should presume ERISA does not preempt areas such as general
health care regulation, and therefore, state action is not preempted so long
as it does not duplicate the causes of action listed in ERISA section 502(a).
More specifically, Pegram made it clear that ERISA provides no cause of
action for traditional medical malpractice claims against HMOs.
The Supreme Court held that Congress did not intend an HMO to be
treated as a fiduciary to the extent that it makes "mixed eligibility"
decisions acting through its physicians.'t ° Such decisions involve
discussions of a plan's coverage for a particular treatment as well as the
"how and when" of the treatment procedures, and these are not fiduciary
decisions under ERISA.'°'
This is reiterated in Pappas v. Asbel, in which the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that an action against an HMO for injuries caused by
its refusal to permit the referral of the plaintiff, a plan subscriber, to a nonnetwork provider was not preempted by ERISA.10 2 The court reaffirmed an

organizations to provide objective review of benefit denials by a neutral, third party, out-ofnetwork physician of equal status to the tieating physician). See also Wash. Physicians Serv.
Ass'n v. Gregoire, 147 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 1998), ceri. denied, 525 U.S. 1141 (1999),
(upholding a state law requiring HMOs and other managed care organizations to offer
alternative medical services such acupuncture, massage therapy, naturopathy, and
chiropractic services).
98.
530 U.S. 211 (2000).
99.
id. at 237.
100.
Id.at 23 1.
101.
Id. at 228-29.
102.
768 A.2d 1089, 1090 (Pa. 2001).
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earlier ruling that the plaintiffs claim presented a mixed eligibility and
treatment decision properly redressed through state
medical malpractice
03
law as per the Supreme Court's ruling in Pegram.1
The Seventh Circuit similarly held in Rice v. Panchal that a
subscriber's claim that the plan administrator was vicariously liable for the
plan physician's negligence under the state law theory of respondeat
superior was not preempted by ERISA.' °4 The court held that a suit was an
action to enforce rights only if the claim rested upon the terms of the plan,
or resolution of the state law claim would require interpretation of the
ERISA plan. 0 5 Courts are reluctant to interpret benefit plans and their
application, and this seems logical. However, the number of cases in which
the primary physician has a proposed treatment regime or referral denied as
"not medically necessary" seems to be growing. In short, it is all too easy
for medical directors to cross the fine line between benefits determinations
and treatment determinations. The Pegram Court attempted to develop a
standard to prevent this from occurring.
According to the Court in Pegram, "how and when" treatment
decisions ("mixed eligibility") specifically include: "physician's
conclusions about when to use diagnostic tests; about seeking consultations
and making referrals to physicians and facilities other than [the HMO's];
about proper standards of care, the experimental character of a proposed
course of treatment, the reasonableness of 0a6 certain treatment, and the
emergency character of a medical condition."'
Although these are decisions germane to the function of an HMO as a
"for-profit" proprietary entity and they lead to the rationing of care (which,
according to the Court, is the very point of any HMO scheme and may be
adverse to the beneficiary's interest), 0 7 they are, nevertheless, mixed
eligibility decisions that are not preempted by ERISA. The Court stated
that "in an HMO system, a physician's financial interest lies in providing
less care, not more,"'108 but mixed eligibility decisions must remain
vulnerable to attack from state causes of action.
The rationale of the Court's holding is two-fold. First, it hinges on a
common language understanding of a "plan" as something decided upon in
advance." °9 "Mixed eligibility" decisions are not agreed to in advance

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
65 F.3d 637, 645 (7th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 644.
Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 229-30 (2000).
Id. at 219-21,225.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 223.
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because they focus on the procedure's status as an "indicated treatment" of
the plan, and "how and when" the treatment will be pursued.°10 An HMO is
clearly not acting as a fiduciary in carrying out its primary function to
decide when and how to provide the contracted services."' Secondly, the
Court's decision reflects a concern for preserving the integrity of HMOs as
for-profit entities." 2 Rationing of benefits (for profit) is part and parcel of
the very reason for the existence of HMOs and allowing challenges under
ERISA" 13 for breach of fiduciary duty would prove fatal to their
existence.' 14
The fiduciary duty envisioned by Congress under ERISA is analogous
to that of a common law trustee." 5 Those who control plan assets are
fiduciaries and must use assets solely in the interest of plan participants and
beneficiaries. The fiduciary may be named, (i.e., the person(s) named in the
plan document responsible for the plan), or unnamed (i.e., a fiduciary by
function). 16 Any person(s) exercising any discretionary authority or control
in managing plans, offering investment advice, or acting with discretionary
authority or responsibility in plan administration has a fiduciary
responsibility. 17 "The most fundamental duty owed by the trustee to the
beneficiaries of the trust is the duty of loyalty ... It is the duty of8 a trustee
to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries." "
However, the Supreme Court held that "beyond the threshold
statement of responsibility ...

the analogy between ERISA fiduciary duty

and common law trustee becomes problematic." '"19 Fiduciaries may "have
financial interests adverse to beneficiaries,' 120 and therefore, HMO

110.
111.

Id. at 222-23, 231.

Pegram, 530 U.S. at 226-27.

Id. at 220-21.
112.
113.
ERISA was designed to protect all employee benefit plans established and
maintained by an employer engaged in, or affecting, interstate commerce. An employee
benefit plan is either pension or welfare. A welfare plan is "any plan, fund or program
established and maintained by an employer, or a union, or both, to provide through the
purchase of insurance or otherwise. Welfare plans provide medical, surgical, or hospital care
or benefits; benefits to cover sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment; vacation
benefits, scholarship, training and apprenticeship programs; and day care. See 29 U.S.C. §
1002.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Pegram, 530 U.S. at 233 & n.l1.
Id. at 223-24.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1002; 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21 (2003).
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002, 1105 (2000).
2A AUSTIN WAKEMAN ScoTr & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §

170 (4th ed. 1987).
119.
Pegram, 530 U.S. at 225.
120.
Id.
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administrators working through their doctors when making mixed
eligibility decisions are not acting as fiduciaries.' 2 1 Likewise, an HMO is
not functioning as a fiduciary when it incorporates or contracts with an
employer for services, and there is no fiduciary liability for acts preceding
fiduciary status. 22 Thus, we must follow the rule that HMOs are not
(generally) fiduciaries under ERISA even though employee welfare benefit
plans under ERISA section 3(l)(A) include, "medical, surgical, or hospital
care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability,
death or unemployment,"' 123 and HMOs have discretionary authority over
"medical, surgical and hospital care and benefits."
The only possibility that an HMO may be acting as a fiduciary is
"insofar as it has discretionary authority to administer the plan."' 24 "Pure,
unmixed eligibility decisions" and "discrete administrative decisions
separate from medical judgments" made by an HMO are not fiduciary in
nature. 125 Regarding such decisions, the Pegram Court stated that "ERISA
does require ...

that the fiduciary with two hats wear only one at a time,

and wear the fiduciary hat when making fiduciary decisions." 26 This
means that a fiduciary, as such, has an obligation "to disclose
characteristics of the plan and of those who provide services
to the plan, if
27
that information affects beneficiaries' material interests."1
An example of such a case is Pryzbowksi v. U.S. Healthcare,Inc., in
which a beneficiary's claim against an HMO for damages relating to delay
in approving benefits was completely preempted by ERISA because the
beneficiary's claims involved "eligibility decision" and therefore related to
plan administration function. 28 The Court explained that the ultimate

121.
Id. at 229.
122.
Id. at 227. There are some other minor exceptions to the general rule that to
pursue a cause of action for denial of benefits under ERISA, the plaintiff must establish the
defendant's fiduciary status. For example, Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith
Barney, Inc. held that ERISA section 1132(a)(3) authorizes suit against a non-fiduciary
"party in interest" for a breach of fiduciary duty. 530 U.S. 238, 247 (2000). Also, there are
cases which held that claimants may bring ERISA actions to recover benefits against plan
administrators. See, e.g., Taft v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 9 F.3d 1469, 1471 (9th
Cir. 1993); Layes v. Mead Corp., 132 F.3d 1246, 1249 (8th Cir. 1998).
123.
29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2000).
124.
Pegram, 530 U.S. at 227 n.8.
125.
Id. at 230.
126.
Id. at 225. See e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 443-44
(1999); Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996).
127.
Pegram, 530 U.S. at 227 n.8. See, e.g., Glaziers and Glassworkers Union Local
No. 252 Annuity Fund v. Newbridge Sec., Inc., 93 F.3d 1171, 1179-81 (3d Cir. 1996);
Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 505.
128.
245 F.3d 266, 273 (3d Cir. 2001).
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distinction to make for complete preemption purposes is whether the claim
challenges the administration of, or eligibility for, benefits, which falls
under the scope of ERISA section 502(a) 129 and is completely preempted,
or the quality of medical treatment preformed, which may be brought in
state court. The Court determined that these activities fell under the
administration of benefits function, therefore, the beneficiary's claims were
completely preempted by ERISA.
Another example of the "quality of care" standard that the courts now
use to determine preemption is found in Corporate Health Insurance, Inc.
v. Texas Department of Insurance, which held that when a doctor denies
treatment, he makes a "quality of care" decision which escapes ERISA
preemption. 30 By contrast, when an HMO denies treatment, it makes a
coverage decision, and claims over such a decision are preempted by
ERISA. On its face this creates the bizarre possibility that, as the Fifth
Circuit pointed out, "HMO's can escape all liability if they instruct their
doctors to recommend every possible treatment and leave the real decision
to HMO administrators [since denial of benefits is a pure eligibility
decision that is preempted by ERISA]. It is difficult to believe that one of
Congress's goals in passing ERISA
was to shift medical judgments from
' 31
doctors to plan administrators."'
This possibility can be complicated by the fact that most HMOs use
physicians in administrative capacities. However, by relying on the new
"economic impact/quality of care" standard and Pegram's holding that
"mixed eligibility" decisions (i.e., decisions which concern the "how" and
"when" of the treatment) are not preempted, much unnecessary analysis
can be avoided. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana
addressed precisely this issue in, when it stated:
The Pegram Court did not focus on the treatment of
covered beneficiaries or on who provided the treatment. It
focused on decisions ...Regardless of who makes these
decisions, they are all decisions which affect beneficiaries.
We find no principled way to distinguish between a mixed
decision of eligibility and treatment rendered by a
physician employed by an HMO . . . and in a mixed
decision of eligibility and treatment rendered by a

129.
130.
131.

See 29 U.S.C. § I132(a) (2000).
215 F.3d 526, 535 (5th Cir. 2000).
Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 315 (5th Cir. 2002).
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physician engaged by a third-party administrator to make
such decisions. 132
The attitude of this court is precisely what is needed to crack the
impervious corporate veil of managed care and to end the paradox in the
administration of health care benefits identified by the Fifth Circuit in
Roark. While the Indiana Supreme Court in Isaac would make medical
directors accountable for their decisions to employ cost containment
measures, other courts will be slow to follow. The Supreme Court decision
in Pegram holds that mixed eligibility decisions should be pursued under
state malpractice law. 133 However, most states' malpractice laws require the
existence of a patient-physician relationship that will be virtually
impossible to establish in the context of a medical director/administrator
who makes an insurance determination regarding a subscriber/patient.
There is a significant social policy question at issue as well. If medical
directors are held liable for adverse benefits decisions, this may threaten
the entire structure of managed care.
All managed care survives by rationing health care through a costcontainment structure. 34 To the extent that this freed individual physicians
to focus on patient care while medical directors made the insurance benefits
determinations, it improved patient care. Unfortunately, however, to the
extent that it shifted the risk of insurance for treatment to physicians
without regard to their competence and performance, and35 tied in the
physicians' profit margins, it hurt the quality of patient care. 1
Under the traditional fee-for-service reimbursement, the interests of
the doctor and the patient were aligned and both the patient and the
physician saw more medical care as good medical care. 13 6 In contrast,
under managed care, the interests of the doctor and patient are clearly
disassociated. As the Supreme Court pointed out recently in Pegram, "in an
HMO system, a physician's financial interest lies in providing less care, not

132.

Isaac v. Seabury & Smith, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12413, at *25 (S.D. Ind.

133.

Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211,236-37 (2000).

July 5, 2002).

134.
John W. Schuch, ERISA Preemption of State Tort Law Claims Against
Managed Care Entities, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 1221 (2002).

135.
Evidence that trust is the cornerstone of the patient-physician relationship and
hence the healing process may be seen in the public's favorable response to the US
Healthcare's granting physicians more autonomy. See Laura Landro, Living With Change

The Decision is Yours: Doctors Are Starting to Embrace Information Technology and Its
Changing Their Relationship With Patients, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 1999, at R 13.
136.
Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, Managed Care Liabilityfor Breach
of Fiduciary Duty, FLA. LAW REV. I, 7 (2001).
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more."'' 37 Thus, the addition of the HMO to the doctor-patient relationship
inexorably produces a paradigm shift that undermines the relationship of
trust between the doctor and the patient. "Efforts to contain costs, by
forcing physicians to alter their practices to take account of financial
concerns, cut directly across the grain of this ideal [of trust]."'' 38 For
example, in Wisconsin, more than 1.6 million people are enrolled in
HMOs, 39 and the number of grievances against HMOs in Wisconsin
increased by 10% from 1998 to 1999.140
There are two basic reasons for the lack of success in suing for the
denial of benefits. First, the organization of HMOs has been statutorily
defined in most states and limited to the realm of insurance law. Some
states, Ohio for example, prohibit HMOs (or similar corporations) from
practicing medicine and so are relatively insulated from quality of care
issues. Second, and following from this, the administrative practices of
HMOs are more akin to fiduciary duties and claims against them follow the
traditional view of preemption under ERISA. "41
From 1974 to 1995, the courts gave a very expansive rendering of 29
U.S.C. §§ 1132(a) and 1144(a) that culminated in the view that the civil
enforcement provisions of ERISA were of such extraordinarily preemptive
power that they overrode the "well-pleaded" complaint. 142 The Supreme
Court reiterated the preemptive power of ERISA by alleging that it was

137.
Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 211 (2000).
138.
J.Scott Andersen, Is Utilization Review the Practiceof Medicine?, J. OF LEGAL
MED., 431, 435 (1998).
139.
Press Release, State of Wisconsin Office of the Commissioner of Insurance,
HMO Grievances Rise With Consumer Awareness in 1999 (April 3, 2000) (on file with
author).
140.
Id.
141.
ERISA provides two types of preemption: complete preemption under ERISA
section 502(a), at U.S.C. § 1132(a), and conflict preemption under ERISA section 514,
codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144. Section 502, by providing a civil enforcement cause of action,
completely preempts any state cause of action seeking the same relief provided for in the
Code. Courts do not ask whether the state law (action) conflicts or frustrates a congressional
purpose, but whether the state law duplicates an ERISA section 502(a) remedy. Section 514
preempts "all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan described in § 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under § 1003(b) of this title." 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a). Any claim that falls within section 502(a) necessarily falls under section
514; though the inverse is not the case.
142.
See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987). The
traditional judicial analysis of the law used in a state action prior to 1995 involved three
elements: I) whether the law related to an employee benefit plan; 2) whether the state law
attempted to reach the terms and conditions of the employee benefit plan; and, 3) whether
the state law regulated insurance, banking, securities, or was a generally applicable criminal
law. See, e.g., Lane v. Goren, 743 F.2d 1337, 1339 (9th Cir. 1984).
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Congress' intention that all suits brought by beneficiaries asserting
improper processing of claims under ERISA-regulated plans be treated as
federal questions, and that the remedies provided therein were meant to be
exclusive. 143 "Managed care was designed to bring stability and balance to
healthcare delivery in the United States, but its experience in the legal
system has involved only moderate stability and very little balance. There
has been a trend toward broad deference to the industry, so that MCOs are
largely immune from liability."' 44
Since 1995, the Supreme Court has softened its tone with regard to the
reach of ERISA's preemptive arm. The Supreme Court recently held that it
would not find ERISA preemption if the state action had only an indirect
economic influence but did not "bind plan administrators . . . [and
therefore] function as a regulation of an ERISA plan itself.' 45 Courts no
longer ask whether state laws conflict with congressional purpose, but
instead whether they duplicate an ERISA remedy. Any state law cause of
46
action that "duplicates" an ERISA section 502(a) remedy is preempted.1
47
This includes many claims that would normally arise under state law. 1
The new emphasis to preempt "duplicative" remedies under state law
actions is further complicated by the Supreme Court's ruling in Pegram
that HMOs making "mixed eligibility" decisions are not functioning as
fiduciaries and claims against them for denial of benefits rightly belong in
state court. 48 While this constitutes a reversal of twenty years worth of
Supreme Court precedent on ERISA's preemptive capacity, it effectively
places a beneficiary seeking damages for denial of benefits between a rock
and a hard spot with regard to litigation strategy. Filing in federal court,
under ERISA, limits damages and requires the court to engage in the
repugnant task of interpreting a benefits determination under a planned
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Pilot Life v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 56-57.
144.
Michael T. Cahill & Peter D. Jacobson, Pegram's Regress: A Missed Chance
for Sensible Judicial Review of Managed Care Decisions, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 421 (2001).
The claim is reinforced by case law. See Mertens v. Hewitt Ass'n, 508 U.S. 248, 260 (1993)
(reading statutory provisions narrowly to allow only very limited remedies against MCOs);
Reinert v. Giorgio Foods, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 589, 595 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (employing very
deferential review of a decision to deny benefits and an interpretation of plan terms); Weiss
v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
145.
N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers, 514 U.S. 645,
659 (1995).
146.
Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 2002).
147.
See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
148.
Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000). Mixed eligibility involves a
direct consideration of the "how" and the "when" of a treatment that is medically necessary;
as opposed to "pure eligibility" decisions which are simple "yes" or "no" answers as to
whether a treatment is a covered benefit under the plan. Id.
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policy. Furthermore, if the suit alleging breach of fiduciary duty involves a
mixed eligibility decision it is subject to dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Filing in state court demands proof that an HMO's denial of benefits
was truly a mixed eligibility decision for which an administrator or
utilization review board must be shown to have acted in bad faith. If a
plaintiff files in state court the claim is subject to conflict preemption as a
defense. If the case remains in state court, proof of the elements of bad
faith is easily rebutted by arguing on the grounds of the specialized
knowledge of the medical director regarding a course of medical treatment.
The Fifth Circuit recently expressed this "rock and a hard spot"
predicament when it related "that when a doctor denies treatment, he makes
a quality-of-care decision, which escapes ERISA preemption . . . [but]
when an HMO denies treatment, it makes a coverage decision, and claims
over such a decision are preempted by ERISA."'' 49 That same court noted
that the result of this logic "creates perverse incentives for HMO's. If a
doctor fails to recommend treatment, the patient may sue the doctor and
HMO under state [malpractice] law. If the doctor recommends treatment
and the HMO denies coverage, the patient has no remedy ... HMO's can
escape all liability if they instruct their doctors to recommend every
possible treatment and leave the real decision to HMO administrators. It is
difficult to believe that one of Congress's goals in passing ERISA
was to
50
1
administrators."
plan
to
doctors
from
judgments
medical
shift
Prior to Pegram, when a treating physician denied treatment, he made
a quality-of-care decision, which escaped ERISA preemption, and when an
HMO denied treatment, it made a coverage decision that was preempted by
ERISA.15 1 Now, however, Pegram indicates that courts should look to the
substance of the decision, not the identity of the decision-maker, in
determining whether ERISA applies. As a result of the increasing role
HMOs and MCOs play in delivering health care in the United States, the
legal tenor in society regarding their general liability is changing.
Consequently, in the post-Pegram era, "medical malpractice reform
legislation is working its way through state legislatures, specifically
of managed care organizations for health care
addressing the liability
52
treatment decisions." 1
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151.

2000).

Roark, 307 F.3d at 308 n.j 1.
Id. at 315 (citations omitted).
See Corp. Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526, 535 (5th Cir.
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Texas led the way in 1997 with an expanded version of its Health Care Liability Act, which
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WISCONSIN'S APPROACH: EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF LIABILITY FOR
MEDICAL DIRECTORS

Wisconsin does not presently have any plans to revise its medical
malpractice law. 53 MCOs, which have recently been statutorily re-defined
as Defined Network Plans in Wisconsin, are under the auspices of
insurance law and are regulated by the Office of the Commissioner of
Insurance (OCI).154 Defined Network Plans do not engage in the practice of
medicine as such, and so have not been subject to suit for medical
malpractice; though they could be implicated in such a suit through
vicarious liability or respondeat superior. 55 However, Wisconsin Statute
section 609.34 requires that Defined Network Plans employ a physician as
the medical director in charge of clinical protocols, and that each medical
director must carry medical malpractice insurance. This carries significant
implications for Wisconsin in the post-Pegramera.
Prior to Pegram, plaintiffs were between a rock and hard spot in
choosing a legal strategy for adverse benefits decisions. First of all, medical
malpractice has always been a difficult claim to make. Underlying an
assertion of malpractice against a medical director is a claim for the denial
of benefits which courts were likely to hold preempted. 56 Also, in
Wisconsin, Statute section 655 (governing malpractice) states that
malpractice claims must involve some harm or damage to the health of a
patient and a malpractice claim is capable of enforcement
57 only when it is
incurred.
be
will
expenses
future
that
certain
reasonably

allowed an individual to sue a health insurance carrier, HMO, or other managed care entity
for damages proximately caused by the entity's failure to exercise ordinary care when
making a health care decision. Id. at 15B-84 to 85. Arkansas, Illinois and Washington have
followed suit.
153.
See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655 (West Supp. 2002).
154.
In Wisconsin, managed care organizations are usually organized under section
185, section 611, section 613, section 614 or by certification under section 618 of the
Wisconsin Statutes and are now collectively referred to as "Defined Network Plans," under
Wisconsin law. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 609.01 (West Supp. 2002). There are five common
varieties of HMOs: Staff Model, Group Model, Direct Contract Model, Individual Practice
Association and Network Model. The Network Model has at least six common variations
that include Preferred Provider Organizations, Independent Physician/Practitioner
Organizations, Hospital Physician Organizations (or Combined Provider Organizations),
Point of Service/Open Ended Plans, Primary Care PPOs (or Swing Out HMOs), and
Exclusive Provider Organizations.
155.
See OHLSSON, supra note 152 at 15B-90.3. Twenty-two states have statutory
screening panels for medical malpractice, and some states have statutes granting HMOs
immunity from malpractice suits. Id. at 15B.07.
156.
See supra Section III.A (discussing the history of preemption).
157.

See Elfers v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 571 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Wis. Ct.
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Furthermore, a medical director, as such, would not have been subject
to medical malpractice because he/she, like a managed care organization, is
not engaged in the "practice" of medicine in the traditional sense. If a
plaintiff sued for medical malpractice, the medical director had an
immediate defense in the absence of proof of a traditional patient-physician
relationship.
However, the Pegram position on mixed eligibility decisions by
medical directors puts the issue squarely back in the hands of the states.
The Supreme Court has held that where the issue involves a field
traditionally "occupied" by the states, there is a "starting presumption" that
Congress did not intend to supplant state law.' 5 8 Most states regulate MCOs
through state insurance departments and the McCarran-Ferguson Act
confirms the legitimacy of this approach. 159 Therefore, the preemption issue
revolving around MCOs should show a strong tendency to follow state law.
The Seventh Circuit, following Pegram, reiterated this when it held that
"[w]hen the complaint alleges that a welfare-benefit plan has committed a
tort ...[e.g.] medical malpractice-the claim must arise under state law,
because ERISA does not attempt to specify standards of medical care.
Claims outside the scope of ERISA arise independently of federal law, and
the possibility that § 5 14(a) preempts one or another state-law theory is just
a federal defense."' 6
Since Wisconsin does not have a specific statute governing the
operation of MCOs (Defined Network Providers), and claims against
medical directors and MCOs fall under the Office of the Commissioner for
Insurance, a plaintiff can seemingly pursue state claims unencumbered. The
decision to deny benefits is a mixed eligibility decision if it involves an
assessment of the "how" and "when" of the treatment--or at least that is a
fact to be discovered and determined by a jury. But to make sure such a
state claim will not be preempted, it must meet the Seventh Circuit's three
factor test for ERISA preemption: (1) whether the plaintiff is eligible to

App. 1997). Furthermore, since the burden of proximate cause is tied to the claim for
damages, plaintiffs can only collect compensatory damages under Wisconsin law (which
provides no punitive damages, only real economic damages). See Lund v. Kokemoor, 537
N.W.2d 21, 24 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). See also Wis. Stat. § 655.017 (West Supp. 2002).
Therefore, damages must be specified carefully. If it appears to the court that the recovery is
for the cost of completing performance, the court will construe the action in contract,
whereas if the damages sought are for personal injuries, the court will construe the action as
malpractice. See Murray v. Univ. of Pa. Hosp., 490 A.2d 839 (Pa Super. Ct. 1985).
158.
Travelers, 514 U.S. at 645. See also Ca. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement
v. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. 316 (1997).
159.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2000).
160.
Lehmann v. Brown, 230 F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 24

bring a claim under ERISA section 502(a); (2) whether the plaintiffs
causes of action are enforceable through ERISA section 502(a); and (3)
whether the plaintiff's state law claims cannot be resolved without
interpreting the plan, which is governed by Federal Law. When all three
factors exist, the state law claim is completely preempted and properly recharacterized as an ERISA claim under section 502(a). 16 1 Where one or
more of the criteria are not clearly established, a state law claim should
stand.
V. CONCLUSION

Cases such as those involving Judy Amburgey, Cynthia Pegram, and
Carmine Cicio make "health care" in the context of managed care seem
like an oxymoron. As health care costs continue to rise, so do the number
of complaints against managed care organizations. The pressure to meet
financial goals has adversely affected the patient-physician relationship.
The courts have recognized this and have stepped back from their previous
support of MCOs as proprietary entities with legitimate economic interests.
The relaxation of the preemption standard is an important first step in
getting managed care organizations to recognize their responsibility to keep
the "health" in health care.
What the Pegram decision does for plaintiffs in the state of Wisconsin
is to make a suit for medical malpractice against a medical director a more
plausible legal strategy. Since Pegram holds that mixed eligibility
decisions rightly belong under state malpractice claims, and Wisconsin
maintains that medical directors must carry malpractice insurance under
Wisconsin Statute section 609.34, because they are presumed to be using
their clinical knowledge in making benefits determinations, the stage has
been set for a successful malpractice suit for a standard benefits denial.
However, it will still take a cavalier court to view the patient-physician
relationship in the broader context of the era of managed care.
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